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For Helmut Schmidt, the party is over - the result of a vote by
members of the German Bundestag to oust the SPO Ch'ancel 1or

.of eight

years in favor of CDU candidate Helmut Kohl. The Bundestag vote of
October 1, 1982 marks the first time in the history ·of the Federal Republic that the constructive vote of non-confidence has been successfully invoked to replace a Chancellor prior to regularly scheduled
national elections. The only other attempt to remove West Germany's
chief executive by means of a parliamentary ballot occurred in April,
1972, when Christian Democrat Rainer Barzel failed to unseat Wflly ·
Brandt by one vote (with two abstentions).
Peculiar to the Federal Republic, the constructive non-confidence
mechanism was designed to ensure stability of leadership among not-yet-·
entrenched democratic institutions.

It is intended to guarantee the

peaceful trans.fer of power during a period of governmental crisis in a
country whose inability to sustain stable party majorities has been held
singularly responsible for two world wars in this century.

Helmut Kohl

now appears to have a finn grip on the levers of government, parliamentary elections have been scheduled for March of 1983, the Rechtsstaat
has not collapsed.

Liberal democracy in postwar Gennany has undergone

the ultimate empirical test, and the results are positive. There fol. lows a global sigh of relief.
Was there really any doubt that the Federal Republic would rot succeed at democracy? Was there ever a point between the announcement of
the FDP's decision to break ranks with the social-liberal coalition and_
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the appointment of the new Kohl Cabinet when the spectre of 1933 was
briefly seen lurking in the wings?
The transition will certainly not be an easy one for Helmut Kohl-allegedly a 11 nice guy 11 with virtually no foreign policy experience,
whose highest state ·executive offi'ce to date has been the ministerial
presidency in Rhineland-Palatinate.

Unlike another national leader with

a similar profile, Kohl is a professional politician.

Perhaps more

importantly, he is part of a new generation of potential leaders too
young to have directly participated in the events of 1933-1945, one of
a generation whose ascension up the political ladder is grounded in his
capabilities as a professional party manager.

The same problems which

brought about the downfall of the SPD-FDP coalition after thirteen years
--the questions of where to cut the budget, how to stimulate the econo.-:
my, how to overcome growing citizen unrest with respect to ecological
and.-defense issues, how to win back ·alienated, apolitical,

11

no future 11

youth--continue to dominate the agenda, with little prospect for immediate resolution in sight. While the Christian Union has witnessed less
party-internal division over these issues, there is still sufficient
...,,

diversity among its members to prevent Kohl from presenting his platform as the proverbial one best way, on the one hand, and insufficient
11

11

diversity, on the other, to reflect accurately the degree and dimensions
of the polarization that has grabbed hold of large segments of the German
citizenry in recent months.
What holds a democratic system together? The answer provided by

\·--
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Almond and Verba in 1965 was both logical and; simple:

tne right poli-

tical culture. The ideal "civic culture" was defined as one in which
there is a substantial consensus on

the

legitimacy of

political institutions and the direction and content of
public policy, a widespread tolerance of a plurality of
interests and belief in their reconcilability and

a

widely distributed sense of political competence and
mutua 1 trust in the citizenry. 1
The civic culture rests on a measure of citizen conmi'bnent_to democratic values, processes and institutions

(the authors werenever·ex-

plicit about how-much-is-enough). Support for the system is presumably
diffuse, that is, not attached to specific instances of system performance.

Related to the need for diffuse support, yet certainly under-

estimated in Almond and Verba's assessment of Germany's democratic pros~
pects in the early 1960 1 s, is the role played by a positive sense of
national identity.

The relation would appear to be a reciprocal one.

Conmitment to a particular system and its established institutions re-·
quires that citizens first be able to identify the boundaries of that
system (nationhood commonly understood to involve shared language,
hi story and common customs in a given terri tori a 1 space). The outputs,
i.e. decisions ~r policies of that system, must be clearly distinguishable
from those of other systems. Both the Gennan occupational experience
and the unresolved issue of reunification, up until the Quadripartite
Agreement of 1971 and the Basic Relations Treaty of 1972, hindered the
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Federal Republic in its efforts to define itself as a sovereign nationstate.

Conversely, as David Conradt has argued, "the absence of a

shared attachment to a particular state and political system has thus
been the missing component in the German sense of national identity. 112
Inquiries into the character of West Gennan political culture are
once again .in vogue. The appearance of Almond and Verba's The Civic
Culture Revisited in 1980 enabled a select number of country-specialists,
anned with the wisdom of hindsight and the products of much more sophisticated survey researc~ technology, to revise earlier interpretations
and to review the impact of later developmen~ on their respectiv~ political cultures as a whole. Of the five nations originally studied, the
Federal Republic has clearly emerged as the one' having undergone the
most dramatic transfonnation, even if it was not voted the system 11 most
1i kely to succeed 11 at the time of the surveys .. Fonnerly .a travesty of
political development, the FRG has become a participatory dynamo, a
leading actor in Western Europe, an anchor in the stonny seas of international political economy; in short, it has been labeled a 11 laboratory
for the study of political change. 113
This essay attempts to synthesize the findings of five relatively
1

recent works on the. evolution of the West German political system, in
pursuit of three general themes.

The first addresses the special condi-

tions confronting the Federal Republic in its early efforts to cultivate
a democratic political culture. Edwin Hartrich in particular explores
the relationship between a thriving economy and the attainment of a
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stable democracy.

He is not alone in underlining the advantages in-

herent to many trade-offs the Bonn government was forced to make as a
defeated power in the late 1940 1 s and early 1950's. The Second theme
addresses questions contrasting the diffuse support lately found .to
exist among German citizens for the system as a whole, and qualms arising
from 11 offenses 11 launched against particular decisions·or elements of
that system (e.g. the reaction to Ostpolitik., the allegations of unresponsiveness on the part of "catchall" political parties). Baker,
Dalton and Hildebrandt conclude that the Federal Republic has "come a
long way, 11 while- Conradt and the Greiffenhagens are conscious of the· many
potentially explosive 1ssues mining the path that still lies ahead.

The

third theme looks to the meaning of change, focusing on a metamorphosis
in the Gennan "understanding of democracy" which manifests itsel.f in the
clashes .between Old Politics and New Politics, between conventional and
unconventional concepts of participation. Subject competence and a
willingness to participate rest at the heart of the Civic Culture, as
originally defined. The larger question is what concept of democracy
has detennined the development of political culture and access to political institutions over the last thirty five years, and what model o,f
democracy Germany is 1 ikely to pursue in the future.
ECONOMIC GIANT, POLITICAL DWARF
Edwin Hartrich argues that material insecurity served as the driv~
ing force in German efforts to create a stable political system. The

.,..7_

memory of economic hardships suffered during the thirties, reinforced
by the inflation and unemployment nightmares of the late 1940's, turned
the search for material security into a national quest.

The argument

suggests that German citizens have come to embrace democratic institutions for their ability to promote growth and preserve economic stabi1i ty.

Hartrich's characterization of Germany in the seventies as the
11

Fourth and Richest Reich" rests on the assumption that the leaders of

the new Repub 1i c found in ecom;>mi cs a most sa ti sfyi ng Ersatz for po 1i tics.

Indeed, after its unconditional surrender in

May,

1945, Germany

had no choice but to seek a new raison d'~tre, having been stripped of
all political functions by the. Allied Command.
has a happy ending;
11

For Hartrich, the story_

the Wirtschaftswunder·, based on a free, albeit

social 11 market economy, proved to be one of capitalism's finest hours.

Prevailing wisdom maintained that an affluent state could be expected
to produce a stable political ·state, even if the initial occupational
directives for the dismantling of German industrial capabilities clearly
contradicted this premise.
-Effusive in his praise for Erhard's bold and unflinching commitment to a 11 supply and demand" strategy, beginning with the currency re. form of 1948, Hartrich unwittingly prepares a case in favor of prewar
economic management strategies and against the untrammeled forces of
competitive capitalism. The ~llies, in fact, could have seriously
bungled the occupation, had not the Korean war intervened and left the
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new Republic to dig its own way out of the rubble.

As the regular

Prnerican troops clamored to be sent: home less than a year after the
German surrender, they were replaced by new draftees with only weeks of
military experience. An estimated fifty percent 'of these draftees showed
an intelligence rating of 50-90; a Class Five soldier with a rating
of 75 or below "was considered little better than a moron in unifonn,
fit only for simple labor such as trench-digging 11

hardly a suitable
role model for introducing _the democratic persona1i ty. 4 For an over--

whelming portion of the civilian population, the years 1945 to 1947
marked Gennany's 11 darkest hour, 11 as unemployment rose sharply owing to
industrial disruption, some 7.8 million refugees poured in from the
East, and caloric ,intake during the coldest wi.nter of the century dropped from a prewar level of 3,000 to 1.,550 to- 700 calories .. a day. 5 The
Zigarettenwirtschaft, the black market which recognized Lucky Strikes
as a de facto reserve currency, was pennitted to remove scarce food and
j

energy supplies from nonnal circulation for two years, before Allied commanders realized that guaranteed military exchange rates for East and
West occupation marks had resulted in a $800 million subsidy to the
Soviet Union. 6
Initial occupational directives, including a watered-down version
of the Morgenthau·Plan contained in JCS 1067, ignored the hfstorical
lesson that democracy is unlikely to develop out of defeat..

Clearly, a

Germany rendered industrially impotent had little chance of establishing
a stable political system.

It was naive to assume that a civic culture
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could begin to flourish in a society of economically insecure, quasiindentured servants.
Di verse denazi fi cation mechanisms adopted in the three Wes tern
zones showed the United States to be most persistent in its efforts to
track down Nazi accomplices at the lower levels--while many major offenders went unpunished and unpursued. Convict:ions of minor offenders
deprived the system of critical, qualified personnel during the reconstruction; 50 percent-of the prewar doctors, for example, served as
ditch~diggers during a time when poor nutrition was resulting in ever
higher disease rates. Bureaucrats were summarily denazified and returned to their posts. 7
Demilitarization policies proved equally inconsistent with abstract
Allied intentions of transforming the remnants of·a dictatorship into
a democratic polity. The Western zones, on their own, were defenseless
at a time when Soviet encroachment in Europe was rapidly becoming the
focal Allied concern.

Less than ten years after surrender, the new

Republic was forced to undertake a rapid rearmament program in support
of American cold war efforts, despite a nation-wide opposition campaign,
the Kampf dem Atom-Tod movement.

From the beginning, Germany-West served.

as the European linchpin in the US campaign against communfsm--a heavy
responsibility for a land with no material surplus and no prior success
with democracy.
As American attention shifted to the Asian theater, the "Chancellor
of the Allies," Konrad Adenauer, was left to monitor an economy that
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quickly reverted to old mangement practices, such as cartelization, and
fonner production activities~ i.e. quick revitalization of the steel
and ship-building industries. 8
Financial assets were concentrated.
on the basis of shareholders• proxie votes, turned over to the boards
of major banks (Depotstirrrnung). Reconstruction entrepreneurs were
blessed with an abundance of state incentives, and labor costs were held
low by post war unemployment.
1

Politics for Adenauer consisted of efforts to secure equal standing for the Bonn government in the cOtmJUnity of European nations. His
11

non-policy 11 toward the Eastern sector was in essence a variation on

the Ersatz theme; his motto 11 negotiation through strength 11 rested.on
the be·lief that a booming West German economy would exercise a magnetic
influence on citizens in the East, whose unfulfilled material and political needs would move them to throw off the forces of conmunism and
to seek reunification under Western tenns. Social-Democratic hopes for
reunification were dashed by the events of 1959 to 1961. The Godesberg
Program of 1959 accepted the free market fonnula as much competition
11

as possible, as much planning as necessary.

11

By the time of the con-

struction of the Berlin Wall, the metamorphosis of the SPD irito a majoritarian-hopeful party was almost complete.· Final confinnation of its
new standing as a non-Marxist 11 people 1 s-party 11 came with th.e installation
of the SPD-FDP coalition in 1969.
As late as 1975, the New York Times had.yet to abandon Willy

Brandt's characterization of the Federal Republic as 11 an economic giant,
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but a political dwarf. 119 The time has now come to question the appropriateness and. the accuracy of such a designation.

In a global system

beset with multidimensional economic crises, economic strength has
replaced sheer military might as the new basis of pol i ti cal power to
a significant degree (Ronald Reagan 1 s attempts to turn back the clock
to the days of unchallenged American military superiority notwithstanding.).

In the 1980 1 s, a true measure of a nation I s power and its

international influence can be derived from its industrial-technological
capabilities, its stable monetary reserves, its freedom to search out
its own export-import partners and its success in negotiating favorable
terms of trade. lO
The ecopolitical state to which Hartrich'gives such high marks
11

11

cannot be equated with the civic culture.

The unique consensus on.

national priorities through the early fifties made it possible for a
quickly constructed ship of state to remain firmly anchored in a turbulent sea of international relations.

As was to be expected, that

consensus began to dissipate once economic security had been achieved.
The new sociopolitical conflicts that occupied the center stage from
the late sixties to the mid seventies escape Hartrich 1 s purview. But
what will hold the institutions together once economism is no longer an
effective· ad.hesive? Is there a danger that the institutions will -be .
jettisoned, if it appears that economic security is beginning to erode?
Unlike the ecopolitical state, the civic culture by definition presumes, in fact encourages, a plurality of interests.

A truly civic
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culture would decry the conduct of politics by economic managers in
lieu of alternating, responsive, elected officials. The weighty consensus that holds the ship to its moorings can not be ·used to propel it
out to sea, once the storm has subsided.
The rest·of the world is no doubt still rather puzzled as to why
the Gennan citizenry saw fit to dispose of Helmut Schmidt, recognized
globally as a fonnidable statesman, over questions of economic perfonnance.

At this writing, both the Gennan unemployment rate of 7.5

percent and an inflation figure of 5-6 percent register as the lowest
among the advanced industrial nations. These figures sooner provide
grounds for emulation (and possibly envy), than for removing a chancellor
from office.
Economic discomfiture ,is not. solely responsible for the fortnight
of chaos preceding the non-confidence vote.' Disq,greement over specific
budgetary cutbacks may offer a reason for the FOP' s decision to resign
"from the coalition an September 17.

It does not explain why the SPD

was able to draw a startling 42.8 percent of the vote in the cri ti.cal
Hessian election on September 26, only to prove incapable of rallying
:..

the.forces of the left scattered across the parties to back Schmidt on
October 1, 1982.
Nor is successful economic performance to be judged the only source
of legitimacy enjoyed by the political system. With all due respect to
Fassbinder, the political metaphor for postwar Germany is neither Maria
Braun, nor Veronika Voss.

It is Oskar at the grave of Matzerath, putting
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aside the drum that was both his salvation and livelihood, as he makes
his conscious decision to grow. 11 Under Schmi dt, the Federal Republic
1

•

has come of political age, though the growing pains are likely to remain acute for some time.

The reasons for Schmidt I s downfall are deci d-

edly political, rooted in growing popular disaffection with a concept of
democracy too narrowly defined as a Parteienstaat.
not put a halt to the search for identity.

Growth~ se does

Democracy is not equivalent

to a steady state.
DIFFUSE SUPPORT AND ISSUE CONFLICTS
Conradt, the Greiffenhagens, Baker, et ~-have undertaken two common tasks:

to verify, for better or worse, the stabi 1i ty of West Gennan~

political institutions, and to show that stability is a function of
diffuse, if not 11 active
fonnance.

II

support, no longer dependent on economic per-

The dominant theme is change, the prognosis is generally pos-

itive.
Gennany Transfonned - Political Culture and the New Politics is an
attitudinal history of the Republic in miniature, none of whose findings
are counterintuitive.

Like the quasi-paradigm of 11 Post-Materialism 11

from which the more interesting hypotheses are estensibly -derived, the
study postulates a Maslowian-type scale of national needs and political
interests.

The internal logic of this scale dictates that 11 ttie approach-

ing resolution of material and security issues will result in the add; tion of new issues to the po 1iti cal agenda.

Increasingly, po 1i ti cs wi 11

l
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be concerned with questions of life styles and the quality of life, rather
than the guanti ty of economic rewards. 1112
The transfonnation of the political agenda owes to three interacting
and occasi ona1ly overlapping sources of change. ~lot surprisingly,
Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt underline the significance of economic
development which has weakened, if not eliminated, traditional social
class cleavages, thereby modifying the language as well as the substance
of political debate in the Federal Republic. The survey data are used
to explore the extent to which economic and occupational trends accompanying the advanced industrialization of Gennany have strengthened
the support for democratic nonns and increased political involvement.
Justifiable pride in the miraculous achievements of the economy has.
given way to a sense of confidence in the overarching institutions.
Affluence and technological advancement have worked in concert to pro".'
vide·both the free·time and the access to infonnation-necessary for
more meaningful political involvement. The subsequent expansion of the
higher educational system has outfitted members of the new middle class
with conceptual skills, knowledge of the system s .weaknesses as well as
1

strengths, and the inclination to participate.
Baker, Dalton and Hildebrandt are more sensitive than Hartrich to
the impact of generational change on the degree of system acceptance.
They delineate five historical periods·(Wilhelmine, Weimar, Third Reich,
Early Republic-of 1946-1955, late Republic, post-1956) in efforts to assess
at what age respondents will be subject to maximal influences from the
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domestic and international, political and economic environments. The
negative political experiences affecting cohorts during the first three
periods have produced citizens who are understandably more reluctant to
give vent to opinions regarding domestic political developments. The
international order poses qualitatively different types of threats to
the security needs of individuals whose socialization is confined .to
the two.postwar periods.

Accustomed to economic miracles and ideolog-

ically hostile spheres of global influence,younger cohorts are free to
develop criticisms directed against the internal operations of the system in a way that the Grt.lndergeneration could not.
Dramatic sociopolitical changes in the Federal Republic are also
· attributable to the metamorphosis in the character and qualifications of
political elites.
11

Hartrich deals only with those he judges to be the

great me11 of modern German history, such as Adenauer, Erhard, Krupp,
11

Schiller.

Baker et .!l. attend to the influence of a new leadership class

which comes to power after the watershed election of 1969. The SPD is
judged to have made an independent contribution to the acceptance of
democratic institutions and the accelerated decline of class cleavages.
Unprecedented economic recovery, radically different socialization
patterns and the ideological shifts represented by a new political leadership have precipitated changes in the political culture, changes in the
political agenda and changes in the nature of Gennan partisan politics •
. The Federal Republic emerges as a system in which interest in politics
is on the rise within and across a11 income groups; willingness to par,..

-16ticipate continues to grow, particularly among members of an· expanding,
professional "new middle class." A veritable explosion in the numbers ..
of voter and citizen initiatives beginning in the late 1960 1 s lays to
rest the image of Gennany as a passive 11 subject 11 political culture, devoid of a sense of par:tisanship and efficacy. The focus on economic
concerns has· thus far been inversely related to the perceived health
of .the economy, with the.exception of a temporary downt~rn in 1966-67.
But as Baker and associates also discover, "perceptions of the economy
changed in response to altered political constellations, not political
a11 egi ances in res pons-e to economic even ts. 1113
Adenauer 1 s willingness to relinquish claims to national sovereignty
in favor of European integration efforts amounted to a paradox of sorts,
in that it actually hastened the recognition of Germany as a sovereign
state within the Defense COJTD1tunity in 1954. The SPO ended its opposition
to integration, once it realized the costs.of reunification were prohibitive. By the late 1960 1 s, it was the SPO pushing ahead in. efforts. .
to cultivate good relations with both the East and the West. Survey
resu·lts indicate that a public which was becoming increasingly interested
in foreign affairs, also increasingly came to support and demand a more
11

cooperative foreign policy stance - inprofound contrast to orienta..
11

tions during t he Ear 1y Repub 1,. c. 14·
As foreign policy emphases shifted from reunification to security
to detente, domestic concerns moved from Fressen to Moral, from an interest in material outputs only to a focus on political processes and
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quality of life issues .. Urging citizens to 11 dare more democracy!1 Brandt
proposed to initiate an era of sweeping internal refonns, most of which
lost out to Ostpo1itik.

The SPD was at once the harbinger and chief bene-

,1.

ficiary of the New Politics, though recent events suggest it has been
unsuccessful at incorporating the panoply of new issues.that would have
secured the votes of younger, new middle class activists.

Promising

more, the SPD incurred the risk of disappointing many, in contrast to
the CDU/CSU intent on-maintaining the status quo.
"Gennany Transformed 11 is pronounced a truly civic culture, one in
which participatory nonns are widespread, system support is well developed and genera_lized. 15 But that transformation calls for a sense of
qualified optimism.

The more diffuse the attachment to the political

system, the less rigid and unquestioning the commitment one is likely
to find arriong the successor generation to preserving specific institutions and procedures in their.present form.

In this respect, the FRG

has 11 caught up, 11 indeed may be surpassing more established democracies
by engaging in a fundamental debate as to the meaning of participation
in a democratic system. The proliferation of 11 initiatives 11 points to
the obligation of established political insti.tutions--including parties
--to change and adapt in response to citizen needs, rather than to
satisfy their own organizational imperatives.
Having also "caught up" with the economic malaise afflicting other
advanced industrial societies, will the Federal Republic witness a shift
back to an agenda based on Old Politics? Baker et _tl project a conver- _

gence. of Old and New Political agenda items.
'

One.must caution, however,

\

that a return to old issues of economic stability and national·security
pose gualita~ively different challenges to the policy-makers, in that
they are now expected to resolve all these problems simultaneously, not
in ascending order as the Maslowian scale presumes.
David Conradt's depiction of the Gennan Polity, is both more cautious than the Baker text, on the one hand;; and more optimistic than
the Greiffenhagen assessment, on the other.

The publisher boldly claims

that Conradt's is "the only study of the postwar Federal Republic which
treats the West-German polity as a stable rather than a provisional
-creation whose future holds the ever present threat of some Nazi-coup. 1116
Then why does Conradt fee 1 compe 11 ed to hedge ' his bets, by raising two
(

familiar questions? (1) Has the Federal P-epublic succeeded in consolidating a political system that guarantees a balance between conflict and
consensus, 1i berty and order, i ndi vi dual ism and community? (2) Is the
highly acclaime<i economic miracle of the 1950 1 s and 1960 •s being matched•
by a Genn~n political miracle in the 1970's and 1980's?
Conradt's answers tend in the. affirmative direction.

The German

polity, he holds, enjoys. a degree of legitimacy and consensus unknown to
;;_

any other teutonic regime in the twentieth century. More importantly,
having achieved a degree of consensus, the polity is now confronted with
an array ,of social problems that could not have been addressed earlier,
in part-because they·are themselves the by-products of economic surplus
and democratic ideals.

Conradt is not squeamish in his treatment of

-19-

several of those issues, ranging from terrorism, to guestworkers, to
restrictians on civil liberties in cases banning suspected radicals
from civil service employment.

He is sensitive to the historical ante-

cedents of these problems; however, to accept the-conclusion he draws, that
"Bonn, in contrast to Weimar, is not a Republic without republicans,"
but one in fact "rooted in a solid attitudinal consensus on the values,
processes and institutions of liberal democracyll_ still requires a great
leap of faith. 17 A g_overnment that insisted on subjecting to rigorous
interrogation 454,585 of its most highly educated and politically sensitive young citizens between 1973-1975 in order to weed out the 314
( .0006%_) who might really intend its overthrow, is one replete with
doubt about its own ability to confront conflict and forge conserisus.18

.

Ironically, Conradt turns out to be most thought-provoking in exactly those areas where,he seeks to advance a very cautious interpretation.

The Federal Republic has adjusted to and accepted its 1 permanent

provisional II status, especially in relation to "the other Germany. 11
Survey data show West Germans to be among the best politically informed
,

and the most electorally active citizens in all modern democracies.
Yet the Basic Law which determines the character of citizen-state interactions is itself an essentially nnegative 11 document, created only for
provisional use~

The detailed, restrictive nature of the document was

meant to safeguard the Republ~c against the chaos 9f Weimar and the
tyranny of the Third Reich during its formative years.

Such restrictions

are likely to have a very different impact on a citizenry actively
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committed to democratic-participatory norms. Changing socio-economic
conditions have mandated frequent amendments, 31 in all from 1949 to
1982 -- in contrast ttJ 26 such modifications of the American Constitution from 1776 to 1976. 19 Has the Basic Law outlived its usefulness?
There i.s a growing propensity in the FRG to interpret explicitly ·
political conflicts in constitutional-legal terms.

Political leaders

obsessed with the question of who is/who isn't an "enemy of the constitution11 postpone (or evade) the search for solutions to pressing socioeconomic problems. Those who would maintain a "state of siege" mentality are those who hope to gain politically. The most recent instance
involved the CDU Secretary General, Heiner Geiss.ler, who charged the
widely respected FOP deputy, former state secretary and close friend of
Genscher; Hildegard Hamm-Brtlcher, with "an attack ·on the constitution"
for suggesting that the process of selecting a new Chancellor without
the say of the voters, while legal, "offends morality and general Christian principles. 1120
This is not the rational response.of a politician-coITTT1itted to the
participatory norms of a civic culture. There persists.in the FRG an
unwillingness to look politi~al conflict in the eye as the first step
to resolving it.
ca 1 disasters.

Domestic dissensus has twice resulted in world-politiGermany has not yet digested the fact that conflict and

dissent, not the unique national consensus that benefitted the Republic
in the early years, is the normal state of affairs in a mature democracy.
,

During the nonconfidence vote on October 1, 1982, Brandt even felt compelled to admonish his rival of 1972, Rainer Barzel, to 11 stop acting as

-21-

if this were a question of saving the fatherland.

It is purely question

of party and power interests, and this is the way the majority of citi-

..

zens in this country understand it. 1121
Just as problem children are more often than not the product of
broken homes, Martin and Sylvia Greiffenhagen draw attention to the fact
that the rad i ca 1s, the chaoti cs, the Greens, the citizen action groups
are the offspring of· a schwieriges Vaterland. The children are not
untouched by the afflictions of the father, even if 40 percent of German
16 to 24 year olds report they know little or nothing about Hitler and

the Third Reich. 22 There are significant overlaps between the Baker
volume and the Greiffenhagen study, both in terms of conceptualization
and w.ith respect to the actual data sets used to,, evaluate the democratjc
health and well-being of this intransigent Fatherland. There are few
shared conclusions, however, concerning the real nature of the "civic
culture. 11

·

The Greiffenhagens note that, as a long-standing German tradition
the Rechtsstaat is inconsistent with democracy in many of its key elements.

Efforts to use the Basic Law to reconcile "closed system" con-

straints with conflicts inherent to an open, system appear to rest on
a faulty understanding of democracy, upon a model which has not been
readjusted to serve the particular needs .of German political culture
as it has evolved. 23 The agenda has changed over time to accommodate
'first the economics of reconstruction, the politics of external security, then the promises of social reform and the politics of internal security, respectively.

But instead of welcoming the growing 11.democratic
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potential," the political establishment has ignored, ridiculed and denounced the Kritikfreudigkeit and Partizipationsbereitschaft of the
youngest successor generation.

Politics is construed as crisis manage-

nent; threats to political stability are attributed to the masses, ·rather
i

than to overbe~ring organs of the state; dangers posed by the left are
judged more serious than mobilization on the right. Defense of the
..
constitution (Verfassungsschutz) has become a smoke screen for protection of the State (Staatsschutz) and its vested status guo interests.
The "mutual trust" required by the civic culture is mis.sing.
What causes this. state to eschew compromise? What is it about this:
political culture that leads it.to turn against itself? Without ever
consciously posing the question, the Greiffenhagen analysis provides at
1east an i ndi rect answer.
The Federal Republic is "a CountrY of the Middle. 1124 Geography
dictates that it develop the virtues and skills of a mediator, to foster
a balance between two mutually exclusive Weltanschauungen.
only one or the other would be suicidal.
of the 11 Swiss-solution. 11

To side with

Germany cannot avail itself

It has been denied the right to neutrality

since 1948; to a degree, it has become a major political power against
its will.

This is to suggest that external pressures from tw~ opposing

ideologica-1 camps have thus far kept the Vaterland from mellowing \'lith
age.

The mediation skills acquired during the Ostoolitik era have not

yet been applied domestically.

The links between anti-nuclear energy

protests and the peace movement, for instance, between domestic policies
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· and the state of international relations, cannot be overlooked.

On the

surface, the election of Helmut Kohl will have the effect of improving
government-to-government relations with the US; a fundamental CDU commitment to detente will not prove detrimental to Bonn's relations with
Moscow. The CDU's anticipated crack down on protesters, squatters and
radicals will exacerbate polarization tendencies within the FRG. But
Bonn is not necessarily Weimar.

OLD POLITICS, NEW POLITICS:

QUESTIONS OF STYLE AND SUBSTANCE

A difficult Vaterland is bound to encounter difficult relationships,
the more significant ones involving citizens and political parties.
Overaccommodati on, overgenera 1i za ti on, overins ti tuti ona 1i zati on and
11

overload 11 are the most serious problems affecti_ng the party system,

according to the collective findings of a new German work edited by
,Joachim Raschke.

In the final analysis, however, the major problem is

not that citizens are leaning too heavily

.Q!!;,

but that they have accel-

erated their exodus from the established party organizations.
Overaccommodation: The dominant parties allegedly spend most of their
energy accommodating those vested interest groups demanding preservation
of the status quo, on the one hand, and making too many concessions to
each other in their respective efforts to become the model Vol kspartei,
on the other. . The SPD in particular is open to charges that it has become too comfortable with the status quo, intent on glorifying past
material achievements, rather than advancing structural reform.

It soon-

er resembles a tanker too bulky to budge out of port than an assemblage
11

11
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of vanguard refonners. 25

The Grand Coalition of the late sixties has
given way to the 11 SPCDU-Cartel 11 of the late seventies. 26
Over9eneralization:

The search for a "new party typeJI among radi-

cal democrats and citizen action groups is not a call for a P.artyless
po1i ty • They· ·comp 1a i n i ns tead that p1a tform differences between the
majoritarian parties are meaningless, ritualistic and self-serving; As
"catchall parties," the COU, SPO and FOP hav.e attempted to reduce interests to the least conman denominator,:thus evading critical Sinnfragen
and acting as if 11 al1 problems were equal, 11 according to Raschke.

The

end of ideology has led to a boring routinizationof debate.27
Overinstitutionalization:
state speaks, the people listen.

"Dialogue" 1s the fonnula whereby the
There is a.growing gap between the

social background of the leadership and those they presume to represent.
Parties have created complicated filter systems for funneling discussion
in_to already clogged bureaucratic channels, thereby shutting out those who
choose to identify with neither Tweedledee nor Tweedledum.

A new class of

'·

professional party functionaries has begun to spill-over into a variety of
interest·associations, while civil servants are being dispatched to
perform party-in-government chores. 28
Overload:

If, as. Hans Joe hen Vogel argues,

party offi ci a 1s are

overwhelmed with routine tasks, it is because the established parties
have actively cultivated a 11 jack of all trades 11 image, w~ich they cannot
fulfill . 29

Overload is in part self-imposed; the parties "feel respon-

sib,le11 for everything, from schools to television stations, but are re-

-25luctant to part with these "burdens" even when volunteers are availableo
Politicians perceive citizens' efforts to carve out a larger particfpatory role for themselves as "disruptive;," The public is relegated to
politics-as-spectator-sporto 30 The mass parties claim a monopoly over
creative solutions to social problems, while a 1980 EMNID/SPIEGEL survey
reveals that 78% of the electorate has lost confidence in their ability
to produce solutions, periodo 31

Voters have far greater trust in the

citizen initiatives' ability to provide objective information on social
issueso 32
As Reichel testifies, a major stumbling block to reform is the
historical weight. attached to the concept of the 11 party-stateo 11 . The
Parteienstaat is a postwar invention, resting on, the principle "as much
consensus as possible, a~ little canpetition as necessaryo"

Integration·

is seen a hedge against a reenactment·of the partisan chaos that was
Weimaro
.

The "crisis of the party-state" is foresworn as a "crisis of
· 33

democracyo"

One may feel a twinge of sympathy at the plight of the FDP--it
chose to play the game of political opportunism, and having lost, it must
drop out.
,i

But external challenges to ineffective part1es are not "anti-

democratic." The Basic Law does not mandate a "2½'' party system; to do
so would be to impose artificial limits on pluralism. The "5 percent.
clause" is the bottom lineo

Internal divisions have rendered the FOP

quite capable of hanging itself, without any "help" from the Greens.
The argument can be made that the FDP in many respects served as a de
facto protest party throughout the 1960 1 s and 1970 1 s.

By casting a

-26vote for the FDP, citizens could register dissatisfaction with SPD
performance without jeopardizing the existence of the social-liberal
coalitiono

This might explain in part the record 1006 percent drawn

by FDP candidates in the otherwise decisive rejection of Franz Josef
Strauss in the 1980 elections. The proliferation of "citizen initiatives"
during this period hardly suggests that the FDP, with its traditional
corrmitment to free market growth strategies, was the beneficiary of a
temporary spiritual renaissanceo It was not until the promulgation of
the Dortmund platform in June, 1980, that the Greens succeeded in presenting themselves as a bona fide party of protest at the national level,
many of whose members were drawn from the SPD 1 s disgruntled left wing.
The vote of non-confidence was not a test of Schmidt.'s personal popularity,
but an indictment of an equall_y factionalized, do-nothing SPD. The
Greens become everybody's favorite scapegoat, when in fact the delegitimization of the-established parties results from their own inability-or worse, unwillingness--to synthesize the requisites of the Old with
the New Politicso 34
Hasenclever explains that the New Politics distinguishes itself in
terms of style, substance and structure. 35 The "new party type" seeks
.to build consensus--from the bottom up; the operational emphasis is on
openess, rotation and internal democracy.

Extraparliamentary activity

is intended to complement and accelerate the long march through the electoral institutions;

it is not anti-democratic behavior per g_.

Indeed,

Kaase finds a positive correlation between those engaging in conventional
and unconventional forms of participation. 36 Acti-vists tend to be well
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educated professionals who have more time and self-confidence; in short,
the sense of "efficacy" inherent to the civic culture leads to greater
interest in participation.
The revolution in values is no longer a silent one. The Green and
Alternative Parties are tied to other protest groups in their rejection
of efforts to ·play off economics against ecology. The point is that
rational policies _in both areas are quintessential to the nation's future.
In light ~f their educational backgrounds, the "Post~Materialists" cannot be written off as touchy-feely idealists oblivious to the constraints
of Realpolitik. Their major contribution rests in their ability to force
the established parties into a fundamental reassessment of progranmatic
gcalso
The search for a "new party type" is being 'conducted simultaneously
at the national and coll111unal levelso J.J. Hesse sees the greatest opportunities at the local level--where parties can be held painfully accountable for their (non) perfonnance. 37 The Alternative parties hold that democracy requires a functional decentralization, not just a cosmetic deconcentration of party activity.
The very manner in whic~ Schmidt was deposed as Chancellor seems
to underline the extent to which the Parteienstaat has placed itself
above·the democratic process.

It is not the new configurations being

generated at the base that appear to be the major stumbling blocks to
the further development of a Gennan civic cul tureo
CONCLUSION: WHITHER THE CIVIC CULTURE?
Responses to the_ recent transfer of executive power in the Federal
\

Re pub 1i c have been confused, mixed and even con tr ad ictory. They reflect
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varying degrees of confidence in the German commitment to democratic
values and processes, as do the works considered in this essayo The
assessments have ranged from grim ("end of postwar stability 11 -Zo Brzezinski),
to skeptical ( 11 mired in uncertainty"-R. Thurow), from hopeful ("miracles,
detente, now normalcy 11 -Eo Pond), to satisfied ( 11 a change ••• was needed"Wo Safire)o 38
There is always room for doubto

But there also comes a time for

redefinitiono The civic culture construct advanced by Almond and Verba
in the l960's was a product of the times.

Economically, the world was

a much stabler place; politically, _citizens appeared much more content
to "feel" efficacious than to participate act-ivelyo

In the l960's, the

Federal Republic was judged too young_, too passive to merit the label
11

civic culture;" some would now deny it that honor for being too en-

trenched or too participatoryo

It would prove easier by far to revise

an (undeniably-valuable) political science concept than to try to rereconstruct a complicated socio-political system at this point.

As far

as civic cultures of the 1980 1 s go, the Gennan Federal Republic is demonstrating itself to be no more and no less stable than the other advanced
industrial nations which have sponsored its polit5cal-economic development since 19450 These are nonetheless exciting times for students of
German politicso The current political mood in the Federal Republic
itself is perhaps best captured in the words of Bertolt Brecht:
Ich sitze am StrassenharigG
Der Fahrer wechselt das Rad.
Ich bin nicht gern, wo ich herkomme.
Ich bin nicht gem, wo ich hinfahre •
. Warum sehe ich den Radwechsel
Mit Ungedu1d? 39

Notes
The ideas explored in this paper are the by-product of a politically
exciting, academically productive 1982 Summer research leave, made
possible by the German Academic Exchange Service, the Center for International Studies and·the Political Science Department at the University
of Missouri-St. Louis.
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